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Introduction 
We make this submission on behalf of the Australian Discrimination Law Experts 
Group (ADLEG), a group of legal academics and practitioners with significant 
experience and expertise in discrimination and equality law and policy. 
This submission focuses on two elements of the Terms of Reference: 
• the current legal framework with respect to sexual harassment 
• recommendations to address sexual harassment in Australian workplaces. 
We are happy to answer any questions about the submission or related issues, or to 
provide more information on any of the areas covered. Please let us know if we can be 
of any further assistance in this inquiry. 
Australian Discrimination Law Experts Group (signatories below) 
Dr Dominique Allen, Monash University 
Dr Cristy Clark, Southern Cross University 
Dr Elizabeth Dickson, Queensland University of Technology 
Mr Liam Elphick, University of Western Australia 
Professor Beth Gaze, University of Melbourne 
Associate Professor Beth Goldblatt, University of Technology Sydney 
Ms Rosemary Kayess, University of New South Wales 
Associate Professor Therese MacDermott, Macquarie University 
Associate Professor Karen O’Connell, University of Technology Sydney 
Ms Adriana Orifici, Monash University  
Associate Professor Belinda Smith, University of Sydney 







As set out in further detail below, our recommendations are as follows: 
Recommendation 1: The SDA should be amended to include the object of achieving 
substantive equality. 
Recommendation 2: The definition of sexual harassment be amended to include 
harassment on the grounds of sex.  
Recommendation 3: Further consideration be given to include harassment on other 
SDA grounds (pregnancy, family responsibilities, breastfeeding, relationship status, 
sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status). 
Recommendation 4: The test for sexual harassment be amended so that reference is 
made to the impact on the harassed person other than “offended, humiliated or 
intimidated”. 
Recommendation 5: The test for sexual harassment be amended to include creating an 
intimidating, hostile, humiliating or offensive environment for the person harassed. 
Recommendation 6: The circumstances to be taken into account in determining 
unlawful sexual harassment in s 28A(1A) be amended to require decision makers to 
take intersectional factors into account where relevant. 
Recommendation 7: That the Commission, drawing on its National Survey, produce 
educative materials on the differential impact of sexual harassment on specific groups 
of women 
Recommendation 8: Statutory evidence-based guidelines should be developed by the 
AHRC to assist employers in taking “all reasonable steps” to prevent sexual 
harassment. 
Recommendation 9: The victimisation provision in s 94 should be amended to include 
protection against victimisation for a claimant who raises a claim or makes an inquiry 
about a claim internally in the workplace. Where a victimisation claim is brought, it 
should be processed and heard with the primary claim in order to allow the issues to be 
resolved in one process which is more efficient and effective for the enforcement 
system and the claimant. 
Recommendation 10: That a provision, equivalent to s 106, be inserted making 
employers and principals vicariously liable for harassment of their workers by 
customers and clients unless they took all reasonable steps to prevent it. That s 105 be 
amended to apply to sexual harassment. 
 4 
Recommendation 11: That consideration be given to expanding sexual (and sex-
based) harassment to all areas, without restriction. 
Recommendation 12: That the AHRC be given the power to enforce the SDA by 
taking claims on behalf of individuals and groups. That the AHRC be given the power 
to seek the imposition of preventative and corrective orders and civil penalties on non-
compliant organisations (in addition to seeking remedies for the individual/s). The 
AHRC should be empowered to work with respondents to resolve matters using 
enforceable undertakings. That the AHRC receive additional resources so that it can 
perform this new, important function effectively. 
Recommendation 13: That the AHRC should be given additional resources for 
collecting and disseminating data about the prevalence of sexual harassment and how 
claims are being resolved, and that it should regularly make de-identified settlement 
data available to practitioners, academics and the public (via its website and in its 
annual report). To the extent necessary, the Act should be amended to authorise such 
use of data regardless of the application of confidentiality clauses. 
Recommendation 14: That conciliation should no longer be compulsory and 
complainants should be able to lodge their claim in the federal courts if they so desire. 
Recommendation 15: A positive duty to prevent, rather than merely respond to 
discrimination and sexual harassment.  
A positive equality duty be developed carefully with close stakeholder engagement and 
reflection, is directed at real institutional change, and include: 
• a requirement on duty-bearers to scrutinize organizational practices and 
institutional patterns which allow harassment to occur; 
• consultation and involvement of all workplace participants; 
• training for members of the organisations involved;  
• continued monitoring of the effectiveness of the policies and practices of the 
organisation; and 
• a range of powers for the regulator (such as the AHRC) including compliance 
measures and sanctions to support such a duty. 
Recommendation 16: The AHRC should do what it can to ensure: 
• WHS agencies and employers understand that sexual harassment is a workplace 
hazard that poses a serious risk to the health and safety of Australian workers; 
and 
• WHS agencies acknowledge this and act upon it to: 
o educate employers (and other ‘persons conducting a business or 
undertaking’, their ‘officers’ and workers) about this workplace hazard; 
o develop guidance materials (including a Code of Practice) to enable 
prevention; and 
o enforce the WHS duties in respect of sexual harassment. 
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Recommendation 17: The WHS agencies should be compelled to: 
• engage with the AHRC in developing expertise in identifying sexual harassment 
and sexual harassment risks in work; 
• nominate specific personnel within the inspectorates to develop such expertise 
in identifying sexual harassment and sexual harassment risks in work; 
• engage with the AHRC to develop guidance materials and, ultimately a code of 
practice, specifically in respect of sexual harassment: 
o to help workplace participants prevent sexual harassment; and 
o to enable WHS agencies to hold workplace participants to account in 
prevention steps; 
• Report on these steps. 
Recommendation 18: Amend the FW Act to: 
• explicitly protect workers from sexual harassment.  This could be prohibited as 
a form of adverse action itself, without the need to identify it as a form of 
discrimination or as coming within the exercise of a workplace right; 
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1 INTRODUCTION: CLAIMS SYSTEMS AND PREVENTION SYSTEMS 
Our current federal anti-harassment laws, namely the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 
(Cth) (SDA) and the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRC 
Act), prohibit sexual harassment and allow for those who experience sexual harassment 
to bring complaints for redress. They are designed primarily as an individual rights-
based system of complaints, to allow for redress when sexual harassment occurs, and 
there are well-founded concerns about their effectiveness. An effective system of 
individual redress is an important but incomplete component of addressing sexual 
harassment. These laws do little to prevent harassment within organisations because 
they are not designed for this purpose. 
To address harassment, we need more than laws of individual redress. We also need 
laws designed for prevention, to complement and engage with the system of redress.  
Workplaces have internal organisational cultures and drivers. To achieve cultural and 
behavioural change within organisations, such as workplaces, modern regulatory theory 
says that laws need to prompt the organisations themselves to engage in enforceable 
self-regulation. This involves a process of self-auditing (including consultation) to 
identify how the problem manifests and how it can be addressed in the particular 
context.  Importantly, it also requires an enforcement agency to perform two critical 
roles: to enable compliance, and to enforce it.   
Our anti-discrimination laws currently impose no such positive duties to identify sexual 
harassment risks, to consult with workers or other stakeholders, or develop preventative 
systems. Without them, sexual harassment will remain an ongoing problem in 
Australian workplaces, however much the system of redress in the SDA is improved 
and adjusted. 
Some countries have developed their anti-discrimination claims systems to include 
complementary proactive duties designed to prevent discrimination and harassment.  A 
number of researchers (including ADLEG members) have recommended this for 
Australia.1 As experts in this field, we support the introduction of duties that require 
reasonable steps to prevent discrimination and harassment. However, for such a system 
of positive duties to be coherent with current laws, and supported and effective, there 
would need to be significant research, consultation and public debates about its nature 
and form. Discrimination law is complex in its concepts and effects, and rushed law 
reform efforts can lead to unintended negative outcomes for the stigmatised groups it 
sets out to protect. We are strongly in favour of a careful and consultative approach to 
developing and drafting any new laws. 
																																																								
1 See, e.g. Belinda Smith, 'Not the Baby and the Bathwater: Regulatory Reform for Equality Laws to 
Address Work-Family Conflict', (2006a) 28/4 Sydney Law Review 689-733; Belinda Smith, 'It's About 
Time - for a New Regulatory Approach to Equality', (2008) 36/2 Federal Law Review 117-44; 
Dominique Allen, ‘Removing Barriers to Substantive Equality: A Case Study of Remedying Disability 
Discrimination Complaints’ (2011) 17(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 159. 
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In the meantime, in respect of workplaces, we already have a framework of preventative 
laws in place that could -- and should -- be applied to sexual harassment.  Work health 
and safety laws, in every state and territory, impose positive duties to ensure the safety 
and health, including psychological health, of workplace participants.  These laws apply 
to all persons who conduct a business or undertaking and effectively require self-
regulation to ensure, as far as reasonably practicable, health and safety. And, 
importantly, these laws establish agencies to assist and enable compliance, and enforce 
it. There is a growing international understanding that sexual harassment is part of a 
wider problem of gender violence,2 and needs to be addressed as a workplace hazard 
that exposes workers to risks of physical and psychological harm.3 
To address sexual harassment in work in Australia, we need to: 
• improve the existing system of redress under anti-discrimination laws; 
• develop a preventative response to sexual harassment, by 
o introducing into anti-discrimination laws a complementary positive duty to 
take reasonable steps to prevent harassment; and/or 
o requiring our work health and safety agencies to acknowledge and act on 
sexual harassment as a workplace hazard; and 
• ensure that these systems of redress and prevention work together to avoid 
inconsistency and to enable transformation of the cultures that have allowed sexual 
harassment to persist for so long.  
In this submission, we expand upon these points in four steps: briefly setting out the 
context for our law reform proposals and the importance of ensuring that the regulatory 
goal is one of ‘substantive equality’; identifying how anti-discrimination laws are 
designed to work only and inadequately as a system of redress rather than prevention; 
articulating recommendations for reforming this redress system to make it more 
effective; and then outlining the theory that supports positive duties of prevention and 
ways in which anti-discrimination laws and work health and safety could and should 
be used to prevent harassment in work. We then also outline arguments and 





2 International Labour Office, Ending Violence and Harassment in the World of Work (Report V(1), 
108th Session, 2019), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_637108.pdf. 
3 Deirdre McCann, ‘Sexual harassment at work: National and international responses’ (Conditions of 
Work and Employment Series No 2, International Labour Organization, 2005). 
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2 THE CONTEXT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAWS 
Sexual harassment laws are embedded in a social, legal and cultural context that may 
enhance or undermine the way those laws function. They are also underpinned by an 
international human rights system that establishes fundamental commitments to gender 
equality, and continues to evolve in developing best practice measures for State parties. 
Here, we briefly set out some of the key issues we see impacting the operation of sexual 
harassment laws and argue for a human rights based, substantive equality approach to 
addressing sexual harassment at work. 
2.1 The social context of the SDA 
While sexual harassment has been proscribed in Australia for 35 years, it continues to 
be beset with ambiguities as to how it is understood and applied.  
Context is all important in establishing sexual harassment under the SDA.  
a Sexualisation of women’s bodies and behaviour 
The basic proposition that the law has no interest in sexual activity between consenting 
adults would seem to be relatively uncontentious on its face. However, the definitional 
problem is compounded by the fact that popular culture is suffused with sexualised 
images of women, often with pejorative overtones. The prevalence of such imagery in 
popular and social media underscores the difficulties that inhere within an individual 
complaint-based system, the operation of which includes the workplace but does not 
address areas that produce and circulate representations that pervasively sexualise 
women.  
The sexualisation of women’s bodies and behaviour in popular culture inevitably 
detracts from the idea of equality for women in the workplace, particularly so far as 
acceptance in positions of authority is concerned. The pervasiveness of this sexualised 
cultural backdrop also underscores the difficulty of communicating to the public that 
sexual harassment in the workplace is unlawful.  
b Everyday sexism 
Unfortunately, the disproportionate publicity accorded high-flying harassers such as 
Harvey Weinstein conveys the impression that the facts pertaining to that particular 
instance are typical of sexual harassment and anything less overt is not sexual 
harassment. However, it is the normalisation of the microinequities of sex-based 
harassment to which women are subjected on a daily basis that detracts from the 
realisation of gender equality at work. Although sexual harassment is treated as discrete 
within the SDA, it should not be forgotten that it is a subset of sex discrimination. 
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c Harassment is sex-based as well as sexual 
The excessive attention accorded overtly sexualised instances of sexual harassment, 
particularly on the part of prominent men such as Harvey Weinstein, has served to 
divert attention away from the panoply of harassing acts that might be described as 
sexed as well as sexualised. They include verbal put-downs and gender abuse used 
against women that have become normalised in everyday colloquial speech in a way 
that is comparable to the normalisation of sexualised imagery. Calling a woman a 
‘stupid bitch’, for example, has been held not to constitute the requisite test of sexual 
harassment, although the abusive epithet is clearly sexualised, as well as sexed. 
Abusive, infantilising and demeaning language with sexual overtones may not meet the 
test for sex discrimination either as there is no comparable male expression to that of 
‘stupid bitch’. Its normalisation may also be held to detract from the humiliation, loss 
of dignity and/or injury to feelings. 
Abuse, taunts and insults of a sexually harassing nature that are part of everyday speech 
fall short of satisfying the somewhat moralising test for sexual harassment in SDA s 
28A and may disappear into the gap between sexual harassment and sex discrimination. 
Focusing only on the most overt forms of sexual harassment causes us to lose sight of 
the fact that harassment at work is sexed, as well as sexualised. We argue below that 
the definition of sexual harassment should be extended to include sex-based 
harassment. 
d Changing attitudes to sex and work 
Sexual harassment laws may serve to entrench outdated or stereotyped ideas about 
women’s sexuality and roles at work. The sexual harassment test, which targets actions 
that would foreseeably humiliate, intimidate or offend can play into the assumption that 
women find sexual language or behaviours morally offensive or are easily fearful, and 
need special, more careful treatment than men. Where women have participated in 
sexual behaviours at work or where they are not humiliated, intimidated or offended 
but simply want inappropriate behaviour to stop is not easily captured by the definition, 
with its moral tone and suggestion of female weakness. 
e The individual nature of our system of redress 
All of these broader social factors end up in a system that focuses on the individual 
harasser and harassed. At a formal hearing, a complainant has to establish the requisite 
relationship between the individual complainant and the respondent (individual and/or 
employer). This problem of the individual versus the systemic nature of complaints is 
a complication besetting all areas of discrimination, but it is particularly fraught in the 
case of sexual harassment. The individualisation of sexual harassment complaints 
obscures its systemic nature and its overall effects on women at work. 
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All of these factors: the broader sexualisation of women and a background of small but 
cumulative incidents of sexism; a focus on sexual rather than sexed behaviour; outdated 
stereotypes of women as more moralistic and weaker than men; and the focus in public 
discussion and in law on individuals rather than systemic inequalities makes for a 
challenging context in which to draft and implement effective sexual harassments laws. 
2.2  The international context 
Australia’s social, cultural and legal approach to sexual harassment is situated within a 
broader international commitment to address not only acts of sex discrimination and 
harassment but these broader gender stereotypes and systemic inequalities. 
Article 5 of CEDAW provides that States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: 
(a)      To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with 
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other 
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either 
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women; … 
This important function of governments is foundational to the ability to achieve long 
lasting changes in gender relations towards greater equality between men and women. 
While fully implementing this obligation will require action in a wide range of areas, 
dealing with sexual harassment at work is arguably one of the most important areas in 
which government support for change is needed. The ability to work without fear of 
harassment and discrimination is fundamental to women’s ability to earn a living and 
thereby to exercise their other freedoms and capacities. As long as workplaces can rely 
on sexual harassment laws not being effectively enforced, employers have little 
incentive to make a difference in this area. 
Sexual harassment at work is an important contributor to the demeaning and exclusion 
of women (along with other kinds of discrimination) and contributes very substantially 
to their being confined to a narrow range of occupations and lower pay. There are many 
examples from the reported case law of sexual harassment making work life difficult 
for women, ranging from cases involving professionals and highly paid women to cases 
involving more vulnerable, young, and less well-paid women. Examples include Tan v 
Xenos (trainee neurosurgeon harassed by supervising specialist), 4  Rich v 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (harassment of female partner at firm), 5  GLS v PDP 
(harassment of trainee lawyer by supervising lawyer),6 many cases about harassment 
of women entering largely male-dominated workforces (Hill v Water Resources 
Commission,7 Horne v Press Clough Joint venture,8 Employment Services Australia v 																																																								
4 Tan v Xenos (No.3) [2008] VCAT 584. 
5 This case was settled; see e.g. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2787246/Christina-Rich-
in-2-million-settlement.html. 
6 [2013] VCAT 1367. 
7 (1985) EOC 92-127. 
8 (1994) EOC 92-591. 
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Poniatowska,9 Lee v Smith10). It is vital that these concerns be dealt with to give effect 
to Article 5. 
Article 11 of CEDAW requires state parties to ‘take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination’ in work, not merely to establish a claims system of anti-
discrimination laws. This article includes the right to the same employment 
opportunities, equal benefits, and protection of health and safety (quoted below) – 
sexual harassment in work infringes all of these. 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, the same rights, in particular: 
(a) The right to work …; 
(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, …; 
… 
(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in 
respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the 
quality of work; 
(e) The right to social security, …; 
(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, … 
The draft International Labour Organisation Convention on Ending Violence and 
Harassment in the World of Work that Australia has participated in developing is also 
an important part of this context (see below, part 5.4, infra footnotes 86-93.) 
2.3  Substantive equality and sexual harassment 
How these broader contextual factors can be addressed in practice is through a deep 
commitment to achieving substantive equality. The definition and meaning of equality 
in international law, a key source of Australian anti-discrimination law, has developed 
over time to look beyond narrow, formal understandings of the concept. Removing 
barriers such as laws preventing married women from working has proved extremely 
important in reducing gender discrimination. However, despite the removal of these 
formal barriers in the workplace and elsewhere, women continue to face disadvantage, 
stigma, stereotyping and others harms based on their gender that prevent their full 
inclusion in society. Sexual harassment is one of these harms – a distinct form of sex-
based discrimination that operates to exclude, demean, damage and disadvantage those 
who experience it. Other groups, such as those who identify as LGBTI+, may also face 
gender-based sexual harassment that is equally harmful. The Committee on the 																																																								
9 [2010] FCAFC 92. 
10 [2007] FMCA 59. 
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination in its 2004 General Recommendation No. 
25 used the term ‘substantive equality’ to move away from formal approaches to 
equality that were not adequately ensuring the types of changes needed to overcome 
discrimination. It said substantive equality requires (at para 10): 
... women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling 
environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women 
treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and 
culturally constructed differences between women and men must be taken into account. 
Under certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be 
required in order to address such differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality 
also calls for an effective strategy aimed at overcoming underrepresentation of women 
and a redistribution of resources and power between men and women. 
This definition has since been followed by a number of other treaty committees and has 
been used by constitutional courts in many countries.  This approach to equality 
requires an analysis of the context in which the discrimination occurred and pays 
attention to systemic inequality and the impact of the harmful act or measures to address 
it (at paras 10 – 11). 
Sandra Fredman, a leading scholar of discrimination law, has suggested that substantive 
equality captures the multi-dimensional nature of equality when it contains the 
following four features:11   
First, it aims to break the cycle of disadvantage associated with status or out-groups. 
This reflects the redistributive dimension of equality. Secondly, it aims to promote 
respect for dignity and worth, thereby redressing stigma, stereotyping, humiliation, and 
violence because of membership of an identity group. This reflects a recognition 
dimension. Thirdly, it should not exact conformity as a price of equality. Instead, it 
should accommodate difference and aim to achieve structural change. This captures 
the transformative dimension. Finally, substantive equality should facilitate full 
participation in society, both socially and politically. This is the participative 
dimension. 
Substantive equality has been a key lens for the recognition of gender-based violence 
as a form of discrimination.  It acknowledges that this violence has impacts on women’s 
physical and mental state and that exposes them to harms of ‘recognition’. At the same 
time, violence may have material impacts in adding to women’s disadvantage in the 
workplace and contributing to ‘redistributive’ harms.  This violence also impacts on 
their ‘participation’ in limiting their capacity to function fully and freely in society. 
Lastly, it undermines transformative efforts to create workplaces, schools and other 
parts of society where women can expect to be safe. Sexual harassment is both a form 
of gender-based violence and a form of gender-based discrimination.  It causes multi-
dimensional inequality and requires substantive responses that address all the 
dimensions of the problem.  Discrimination law cannot understand or respond to an 																																																								
11 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2011) 25. 
 14 
individual incident of sexual harassment without locating it within the context of the 
specific workplace/school etc, and the broader context of gender relations in the 
community and society.  Legal responses are not enough if they allow this broader 
context to remain unchallenged and unaltered.  
This understanding of equality should underpin the legislation and this should be 
explicitly stated in the SDA. 
Recommendation 1 
The SDA should be amended to include the object of achieving substantive 
equality. 
 
3 ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS: ONLY A SYSTEM OF REDRESS  
Anti-discrimination law (ADL) has expressly prohibited sexual harassment in Australia 
for over three decades but has done little to prevent it.  These laws are not designed as 
a regulatory scheme for effecting behavioural and cultural change and thus, 
unsurprisingly, are limited in this regard.  In summary, the law can be characterised as 
merely a claims-based system of redress because the rule it imposes is only a negative 
prohibition rather than a positive duty to prevent, it is only enforceable by individual 
claimants, primarily through a private, confidential conciliation process, and for 
individual compensatory remedies.12 Using this framework of regulatory elements – 
rule, enforcer, process and remedy –  we briefly explain below how these limit the 
transformative capacity of the law.  
3.1 The Rule 
Anti-discrimination law merely prohibits discrimination, but does not explicitly require 
any proactive, preventative action of duty-bearers like employers.13 It does not require 
an audit or assessment of risks in the particular workplace, consultation to identify 
possible risks, development of a policy operationalising the prohibition, training or 
monitoring of any policies, or even a grievance procedure to respond to issues as they 
do arise.  The law does expose employers to vicarious liability for breaches14 and has 																																																								
12 Belinda Smith, 'A Regulatory Analysis of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth): Can It Effect 
Equality or Only Redress Harm?', in Christopher Arup et al. (eds.), Labour Law and Labour Market 
Regulation - Essays on the Construction, Constitution and Regulation of Labour Markets and Work 
Relationships (Sydney Federation Press, 2006b); Smith, 'Not the Baby and the Bathwater: Regulatory 
Reform for Equality Laws to Address Work-Family Conflict', above n 1; Belinda Smith, 'Fair and Equal 
in the World of Work: Two Significant Federal Developments in Discrimination Law', (2010) 23(3) 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 199-219; Belinda Smith and Dominique Allen, 'Whose Fault Is It?  
Asking the Right Question to Address Discrimination', (2012) 37(1) Alternative Law Journal 31-36.  
13 Smith, 'Regulatory Analysis', above n 12, 110. C.f., e.g., the positive duty provision in United Kingdom 
anti-discrimination law: Equality Act 2010 (UK) c 15, s 149. 
14 See section 106 SDA. 
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prompted some normative change, so some employers have been prompted to take 
action to prevent harassment, but the law itself does not require such action, inform or 
enforce it. 
Further, there is little authoritative guidance on what does and does not constitute sexual 
harassment in practice, and even less guidance on what needs to be done to prevent it.15  
The Australian Human Rights Commission’s (AHRC) Code of Practice in respect of 
sexual harassment16 goes some way in performing this role, but it is has no legal 
authority, is not in an easily accessible format, and is not regularly updated based on 
best practice in respect of prevention. The law provides a prohibition but, without 
further explanation, individuals (as perpetrators or claimants) might struggle to identify 
whether conduct constitutes sexual harassment. And, for those employers prompted to 
be proactive, there is a dearth of reliable guidance on what works; there is virtually no 
support or guidance to enable prevention.17 
3.2 Enforcement 
Enforcement rights are given only to those who experience harassment under ADL; 
there is no public agency empowered to identify and publicly prosecute breaches.  This 
individual claims-based enforcement suggests that incidents of sexual harassment are 
isolated and private matters, with no wider public implications.  Expecting those who 
experience harassment ‘to identify breaches, press claims, and enforce outcomes 
without any public assistance represents a fundamental regulatory weakness.18 It denies 
the wider public purpose of these laws,19 and ignores the personal risk of victimisation 
faced by claimants. 
3.3 Process 
The process for resolving harassment claims under the SDA involves compulsory, 
confidential conciliation before access to a federal court hearing for enforceable orders.  
While conciliation is relatively accessible, it is overshadowed by the significant risks 
of proceeding further to hearing (such as legal costs), pressuring claimants to settle.  
The confidential process of negotiation and settlement also suggests that the wrong is 
merely a private, interpersonal dispute rather than potentially part of a wider cultural 
and behavioural problem in the workplace warranting public scrutiny and systemic 
attention; if the parties reach a settlement, the problem is considered solved. 																																																								
15 Smith, 'Regulatory Analysis', above n 12, 110-111. Belinda Smith, 'How Might Information Bolster 
Anti-Discrimination Laws to Promote More Family-Friendly Workplaces?' (2014) 56(4) Journal of 
Industrial Relations 547; Belinda Smith and Simon Rice, ‘Mechanisms for Meaning: Exploring ways to 
make anti-discrimination laws more effective by focusing on prevention rather than breach’, conference 
paper, Berkeley Comparative Equality and Anti-Discrimination Law Study Group Annual Conference, 
Melbourne, June 2018 (on file). 
16 Australian Human Rights Commission, Effectively preventing and responding to sexual harassment: 
A Code of Practice for Employers (2008). 
17 Smith, 'Bolstering Anti-Discrimination Laws through Information' above n 15. 
18 Smith, 'Regulatory Analysis', above n 12, 112. 
19 Smith, 'Fair and Equal in the World of Work’, above n 12, 204. 
 16 
3.4 Remedy 
Remedies for those who experience sexual harassment, when ordered by a court after a 
hearing, have been limited primarily to individual financial compensation under the 
AHRC Act.20 In many cases, the level of damages awarded has been very low and this 
creates difficulties both in adequately compensating claimants, and in providing an 
incentive for individuals to enforce the law and for duty-holders to comply (discussed 
further below at 4.3c). While the level of damages needs to be addressed, damages 
alone are not a sufficient response. Without possible sanctions of penalties, punitive 
damages, or corrective orders (such as quotas, policies or training), the law focuses only 
on individual harm and does so retrospectively, which further limits its transformative 
potential.  
Although the Full Federal Court decision in Richardson v Oracle21 was understood at 
the time as setting a new benchmark in the level of damages for sexual harassment, 
there is little indication that it has been followed in subsequent decisions. Earlier 
Federal Court decisions had awarded larger amounts but only in cases of very serious 
and apparently permanent harm.22 The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal has 
on several occasions awarded damages for pain and suffering in sexual harassment 
matters of $100,000 or more,23 and the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
has awarded $70,000 general damages in two sexual harassment matters,24 but other 
decision-makers have not followed, and awards of general damages in reported cases 
continue to be low. This is of concern as it undermines the incentive for enforcement 
of the law and the incentive for employers to take action to prevent it. Instead, it can be 
treated as a business risk that can be discharged through either insurance or paying 
relatively small sums of compensation. While it is clear that in some cases that are 
settled outside court, much larger remedies are awarded, 25  the confidentiality 
surrounding these settled cases makes it impossible to use them to clarify the 
‘benchmarks’ for damages.  
For these reasons, the current regulatory framework of anti-discrimination laws has 
very limited capacity to allow incidents of sexual harassment to be challenged, and even 
less capacity to transform workplace cultures to prevent it in the future.   
																																																								
20  See Beth Gaze and Belinda Smith, Equality and Discrimination Law in Australia (Cambridge 
University Press, 2017). 
21 Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 82. 
22 Lee v Smith [2007] FMCA 59, Employment Services Australia v Poniatowska [2010] FCAFC 92. 
23 Tan v Xenos (No 3) [2008] VCAT 584, GLS v PDP [2013] VCAT 221, Collins v Smith [2015] VCAT 
1992; see also McKenna v Victoria [1999] VSC 310. 
24 STU v JKL (Qld) Pty Ltd [2016] QCAT 505; Green v State of Queensland, Brooker and Keating [2017] 
QCAT 008. 
25 E.g. Rich v PriceWaterhouseCoopers, above n 5. 
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4 HOW TO IMPROVE THE CLAIMS SYSTEM 
In this section we set out the legal and other changes that need to be made to the Sex 
Discrimination Act and the Australian Human Rights Commission Act to make the 
system more effective at enabling claimants to get justice. 
4.1 Rule   
a Definition 
The statutory definition of sexual harassment needs amending in the following key 
respects in order to make it more effective: 
• Include sex-based harassment in the definition, as well as harassment on other 
SDA grounds. 
• Amend the requirement that the harassing behaviour “offend, humiliate or 
intimidate”. 
Sex-based harassment and sexual harassment  
The statutory definition of sexual harassment should be broadened to include sex-based 
harassment. The definition of sexual harassment has been important in focusing 
attention on the behaviour and its impact on the person experiencing the conduct, and 
removing the need for repetition and for workforce hierarchy as elements of the claim, 
but the definition of conduct that is caught is too narrow to adequately protect women 
at work.  This is recognized internationally.26  
Harassment of women at work is broader than directly sexual conduct. The definition 
should include conduct that is hostile based on sex. This would extend the law to 
include sex-based harassment of the kind that was demonstrated in Hill v Water 
Resources Commission, 27  in the same year as the first sexual harassment as sex 
discrimination case O’Callaghan v Loder.28 
Limiting harassment to “sexual” behaviour suggests that women are disadvantaged by 
individual acts of sexual aggression, rather than more systemic inequalities. The 
remedy for sexual harassment then becomes dealing with individual perpetrators. This 
approach diminishes the many non-sexual acts that might form the basis of harassing 
behaviour and make workplaces hostile to women. For example, recent Australian 
research demonstrated that women had to modify their behaviour to avoid harassment 
over their appearance, their potential for pregnancy or negative assumptions about their 
intelligence. Women reported that they felt they had to dress differently, or take off a 
																																																								
26 McCann, above n 3. 
27 (1985) EOC 92-127. 
28 [1984] EOC ¶92–023. 
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wedding ring to avoid assumptions about child-bearing and complained of being 
“treated like a moron”, and not taken seriously compared to men.29  
When women are harassed at work because of their sex, this may still be prohibited as 
a form of sex discrimination, but this requires meeting the separate (and generally more 
onerous) test of unlawful direct or indirect sex discrimination. Further, non-sexual, sex-
based harassment has not received the same level of public or legal attention that sexual 
harassment has, meaning that there is not the same level of policy infrastructure, 
including training, nor are there legal precedents, to encourage workers or their 
employers, to recognize these behaviours as potentially unlawful sex discrimination. 
There is no rational underpinning for limiting harassment to sexual behaviour. Doing 
so has had the effect of artificially created two seemingly distinct categories of 
harassment and channelling attention to the sexual. A better statutory definition would 
include both sex-based and sexual harassment in the same section.  
We note that the Workplace Gender Equality Act already uses this broader formulation 
as an element of Gender Equality Indicator 6, which requires employers subject to its 
reporting obligations to report on their policies on ‘sex-based harassment and 
discrimination,’ thus using the broader classification for reporting purposes and to 
assess employer policies.  It is time for this broader approach to be adopted in the SDA. 
While the specific elements of the current definition of sexual harassment should be 
retained (subject to the recommendations below), the prohibition should be extended 
by adding provisions that cover other types of harassment. Since the SDA also covers 
other grounds, including pregnancy, breastfeeding, family responsibilities, sexual 
orientation, relationship status, gender identity and intersex status, these should also be 
included for consistency. 
A good analogy is disability harassment, which is explicitly prohibited by the DDA (ss 
35, 37 and 39), which provides that ‘[i]t is unlawful for a person to harass another 
person who: (a) is an employee of that person; and (b) has a disability; in relation to the 
disability.’ By analogy, the SDA should prohibit harassment ‘in relation to’ all of the 
grounds contained in the Act. However it is important that harassment under the SDA 
not be confined only to harassment by an employer, but continue to include other 
potential harassers, such as co-workers, contractors in the workplace and even 
customers. 
Other jurisdictions 
This approach is similar to that used in Canada, the European Union, and the United 
Kingdom.  																																																								
29 Marian Baird, Rae Cooper, Elizabeth Hill, Elspeth Probyn and Ariadne Vromen, Women and the 
Future of Work: Report 1 of The Australian Women’s Working Futures Project (University of Sydney, 
2018), 93. 
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The European Union Equality Directive prohibits both harassment on the grounds of 
sex and sexual harassment.30 Harassment is defined as “unwanted conduct related to 
the sex of a person with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person, and 
of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.”31 
Sexual harassment is defined as “any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature with the purpose of purpose or effect of violating the dignity 
of a person, and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment.”32 
In the United Kingdom, the Equality Directive is given effect through s 26(1) and (2) 
of the Equality Act 2010. There is an important difference between the wording of the 
Equality Directive and the Equality Act in that sex-based and sexual harassment are 
prohibited where the conduct will either violate a person’s dignity or create an 
intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.  
Recommendation 2 
The definition of sexual harassment be amended to include harassment on the 
grounds of sex. 
Recommendation 3 
Further consideration be given to include harassment on other SDA grounds 
(pregnancy, family responsibilities, breastfeeding, relationship status, sexual 
orientation, gender identity and intersex status). 	
b Extend “offended, humiliated or intimidated” 
In order for sexual harassment to be unlawful, a reasonable person would have 
anticipated the possibility that the person harassed would be offended, humiliated or 
intimidated. This is an objective test, and one that was amended in the 2011 
amendments to make the test less onerous. This was a welcome change to the law and 
the test itself does not need amending. 
However, the words “offended, humiliated or intimidated” unnecessarily constrain the 
test by delimiting the kind of reaction the claimant is expected to have. Further, if the 
definition of harassment is expanded to include sex-based harassment, these words 
become even less adequate. We need to move on from a view of sexual harassment that 
implies that women find sexual behaviour offensive or humiliating. There will be times 
when women may find either sexual or sex-based negative behaviours inappropriate 
and unacceptable at work, for example, where the behaviours prevent them carrying 																																																								
30 Directive 2006/54/EC Arts. 1(c) and 1(d) 
31 Directive 2006/54/EC Arts. 1(c) 
32 Directive 2006/54/EC Arts. 1(d). 
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out their work tasks or demean them at work. In such a case, the person may not be 
offended, humiliated or intimidated, but have still experienced significant negative 
effects.  
An example of how the existing definition fails to protect claimants of sexual 
harassment arose in the case of TN	v	BF	&	Anor	[2015]	FCCA	1497.	In this case a young 
woman, TN, reported multiple acts of workplace sexual harassment, including 
masturbation, by AB, the elderly founder of the company where she was employed. 
During one incident, TN videoed AB on her phone, while he masturbated for four and 
a half minutes. In her affidavit TN said: “I was disgusted though did not want to leave 
as I did not want to lose my job. I was waiting for him to ejaculate so that I could leave 
the room.” However, the fact that TN videoed the act of masturbation was used as 
evidence that she was not offended, humiliated or intimidated by her employer 
masturbating.	
A better definition would allow for workplace behaviours that are sexual, or sex-based, 
and create a hostile environment for another person to work in, or interfere with their 
capacity or authority to carry out their work. This could be added to the existing 
definition and sit alongside it. 
 
Recommendation 4 
The test for sexual harassment be amended so that reference is made to the 
impact on the harassed person other than “offended, humiliated or intimidated”. 
Hostile environments 
Early sexual harassment case law protected against gender-hostile working 
environments. O'Callaghan v Loder [1984] EOC ¶92–023, 75, 497, involved a sexually 
permeated workplace, but other early decisions found that the cumulative effects of an 
endless succession of petty acts, not necessarily “sexual” in nature, such as nuisance 
calls and upsetting jokes could contribute to a hostile workplace: Hill v Water 
Resources Commission [1985] EOC ¶92–127, 76, 290.33 However, following these 
early cases, Mason and Chapman write that ‘[hostile environment] has not been 
unequivocally embraced as being within legislative definitions of sexual harassment.’34 
It has been referred to in some cases, but in obiter,35 and in others, rejected.36 
																																																								
33 See also Bennett v Everitt [1988] EOC ¶92–244; Bebbington v Dove [1993] EOC ¶92–543; Freestone 
v Kozma [1989] EOC ¶92–249; Hall v Sheiban [1989] EOC ¶92–250). 
34  Gail Mason and Anna Chapman “Defining sexual harassment: a history of the Commonwealth 
legislation and its critiques.” (2003) 31 (1) Federal Law Review 195-224. 
35 Freestone v Kozma [1989] EOC ¶92–249, 77, 377; G v R and Department of Health Housing and 
Community Services (Unreported, HREOC, 17 September 1993). 
36 A v B [1991] EOC ¶92–367. 
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An explicit recognition that the creation of a hostile environment can be a form of 
sexual harassment would help to protect against some of the patterns of harassment 
that otherwise might go unprotected. These would include: non-sexual behaviours; 
behaviours that do not offend, intimidate or offend, as noted above; and behaviours 
that on their own may not meet a threshold for sexual harassment, but cumulatively 
create a particular ‘environment’ of hostility.   
An example of such a law is the Equality Act 2019 (UK), which includes the 
following definition of harassment in s 26:  
(1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if— 
(a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected 
characteristic, and 
(b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of— 
… 
(ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or 
offensive environment for B. 
Recommendation 5 
The test for sexual harassment be amended to include creating an intimidating, 
hostile, humiliating or offensive environment for the person harassed. 
c Intersectionality 
Sex discrimination cannot be understood with reference to the experience of one group 
of women alone. It occurs alongside many other forms of discrimination such as race, 
age and disability. Forms of sex discrimination may affect women of one economic 
class differently from another and may take very different forms in different cultural 
contexts. The CEDAW Committee in General Recommendation No 28 on the Core 
Obligations of States Parties under Art 2 of CEDAW has explained this as follows (para 
18): 
Intersectionality is a basic concept for understanding the scope of the general 
obligations of States parties contained in article 2. The discrimination of women based 
on sex and gender is inextricably linked with other factors that affect women, such as 
race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste and sexual orientation 
and gender identity.  Discrimination on the basis of sex or gender may affect women 
belonging to such groups to a different degree or in different ways to men. States parties 
must legally recognize such intersecting forms of discrimination and their compounded 
negative impact on the women concerned and prohibits them. They also need to adopt 
and pursue policies and programmes designed to eliminate such occurrences, 
including, where appropriate, temporary special measures in accordance with article 4, 
paragraph 1, of the Convention and general recommendation No. 25. 
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Sexual harassment, as a form of sex discrimination, must be understood 
intersectionally. This involves close attention to context, cultural meanings and the 
experiences of a range of groups that have suffered different forms of unequal 
treatment. It may not always be possible to neatly separate racist, sexist, ableist or ageist 
underpinnings of harassment. Our federal anti-discrimination laws, separated as they 
are into categories of discrimination, do not always make it possible to address the 
experiences of complainants who struggle to fit their experiences of harassment into 
the frames provided by the legislation.   
Even were multiple forms of discrimination able to be accommodated in the federal 
legislation, for example, by creating an omnibus act, this would not capture the uniquely 
different experiences that research has shown are the experiences of, for example, non-
white women or women with disability.37  The Commission’s own data demonstrates a 
differential, and amplified impact on particular groups of women.38 
These groups of women, and sometimes men, are not adequately protected under 
discrimination law, and while the problem of their exclusion has been recognised in the 
literature for 30 years, little has been done about it. This Inquiry provides a crucial 
opportunity to address this. 
This is not the first time that there have been law reform efforts to amend the SDA to 
take better account of intersectionality. Subsection (1A) of Section 28A was added to 
the SDA through the Sex and Age Discrimination Legislation Amendment Act 2011 
(Cth) (SADLAA) Sch 1, s 54. These amendments were in response to the Senate 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (the Committee) and their 
Report on ‘Effectiveness of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 in Eliminating 
Discrimination and Promoting Gender Equality’ (Report). 
The Senate had directed the committee to inquire into and report on the effectiveness 
of the Act, with particular reference to (among various other issues) its ‘effectiveness 
in addressing intersecting forms of discrimination’ and ‘sexual harassment’ (Report, p 
2). The Report relating to the subsection (1A) amendment, among other amendments, 
notes that the proposed amendment would allow courts to have particular regard to how 
the protected attributes of a person harassed impacts upon how the person experiences 
unwelcome sexual conduct, and explicitly draws on an equivalent Queensland 
provision for inspiration. 
																																																								
37 See eg, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, ‘What About #UsToo? The Invisbility of Race in the #MeToo 
Movement’ (2018) 128 Yale Law Journal Forum 105; Jessica Penwell Barnett, ‘Intersectional 
harassment and deviant embodiment among Autistic adults: (dis)ability, gender and sexuality’ (2017) 
19(11) Culture, Health & Sexuality 1210. 
38  Australian Human Rights Commission, Everyone’s Business Fourth National Survey on Sexual 




Recommendation 16 of the Report states: 
The committee recommends that the section 28A of the Act be amended to provide that 
the circumstances relevant to determining whether a reasonable person would have 
anticipated the possibility that the other person would be offended, humiliated or 
intimidated by the conduct include:  
• the sex, age and race of the other person; 
• any impairment that the other person has;  
• the relationship between the other person and the person engaging in the 
conduct; and  
• any other circumstance of the other person.  
This section seems, on the face of it, to be directed at addressing intersectional aspects 
of sexual harassment. It certainly could be applied in that way. However, research has 
shown that the section has never been explicitly applied to intersectional sexual 
harassment, and that, in fact, relevant differences in the circumstances of a sexual 
harassment claim are generally overlooked.39 
It could be argued that there is no need for law reform where there is an existing 
legislative sub-section that could be applied to address the problem. However, it is also 
untenable that the serious problem of intersectional sexual harassment continues 
without effective redress.  
We suggest amending existing s 28A(1A) so that the listed circumstances must be taken 
into account where relevant in determining whether unlawful sexual harassment has 
occurred and in assessing the impact on the claimant. 
We also note that while this would require a decision-maker to take intersectional 
factors into account, this would not require that it be done in any particular or 
particularly beneficial manner. In the case of TN v AB, cited above, the decision-maker 
did not explicitly apply s 28A(1A) to a fact situation where the complainant allegedly 
had a disability (a personality disorder), however, in his consideration of that disability, 
he imputed inappropriate sexual behaviour to the complainant, because of that 
disability, rather than to her employer, who masturbated in front of female staff at work. 
Greater awareness of some of the ways that intersectional factors make certain women 
more subject to particular stereotypes and assumptions that can then feed into harassing 
behaviour is required, for decision-makers as well as other legal actors.    
 
 																																																								
39 Karen O’Connell, Unpublished Paper, on file with author. 
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Recommendation 6 
The circumstances to be taken into account in determining unlawful sexual 
harassment in s 28A(1A) be amended to require decision makers to take 
intersectional factors into account where relevant. 
Recommendation 7 
That the Commission, drawing on its National Survey, produce educative 
materials on the differential impact of sexual harassment on specific groups of 
women. 	
d Employer duties and vicarious liability 
This submission argues that in general sexual harassment at work is best dealt with by 
prevention rather than after the fact compensation, and that prevention is best 
undertaken as a responsibility of employers for the benefit of their workforce and their 
undertaking. However anti-discrimination law does not provide enough incentive for 
all employers to take this obligation seriously.40 While a positive duty to take better 
steps towards prevention would be a very worthwhile advance, and is addressed further 
below, there is an existing negative duty that can also be improved on. We argue that 
what matters more than the positive or negative nature of the duty is its being publicised 
to employers, its enforceability, and its actual enforcement. As noted above in the 
comment on Richardson v Oracle, there are substantial concerns about the major 
barriers to enforceability of Australia’s harassment and discrimination laws. When the 
law can only be enforced by those subject to the conduct, and yet they are deterred from 
enforcing it by the legal process, then in effect it becomes unenforceable. That 
undermines the rule of law and the promise of enforceable rights that Australia has 
undertaken to provide. Once it is widely understood that enforcement of the law is very 
difficult, it is likely to be seen by duty-holders as weak and only symbolic and therefore 
as not requiring compliance. There is little doubt that an improvement to enforceability 
is needed, whether through allowing agencies to assist with enforcement or through 
making it easier and less risky for affected individuals to enforce the law. However, 
more effective would be to review and improve the duty on employers.  
We argue that the duty on employers is currently set too low. After more than 30 years 
the SDA, and its sexual harassment prohibitions, have not succeeded in ensuring that 
all organisations take seriously their obligation to prevent sexual harassment and to 
ensure fair and effective internal processes for dealing with complaints.41 It is time to 																																																								
40 Instead there is a temptation for even rational and well-intentioned businesses to dismiss it as a 
business cost and if the amounts involved remain small and relatively manageable, to avoid the effort of 
changing.  
41 This was illustrated in 2018 in the cases of sexual harassment complaints mishandled by the Sydney 
Theatre Company and the National Party, in the absence of effective complaints procedures. 
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further develop this duty to ensure that the most effective methods of prevention are 
used. This would ideally be done through legislative change, but could also be done in 
a more flexible way through a code of practice issued by the AHRC, provided the code 
was given legal status as a required relevant consideration in assessing compliance and 
compensation/ remedies in sexual harassment claims.  
The current duty in s 106(2) of the Act requires employers to take ‘all reasonable steps’ 
to prevent sexual harassment in their workforce. What ‘all reasonable steps’ means is 
not set out in the legislation. It is given its meaning by case law, and although there 
have been few cases setting out what is required, those cases indicate that it will depend 
on the context, including the size of the company, and that a statement or policy making 
it clear that sexual harassment is unacceptable and unlawful, a communication of that 
statement/policy, and effective grievance procedures are required.42  
The legislation and the scant case law fails to give adequate guidance to employers, 
many of whom are not in a position to undertake research on their own account. Of 
further concern is emerging sociological research that measures to prevent sexual 
harassment may in fact worsen gender inequality.43 Given this, it is no longer sufficient 
to assume that a generic sexual harassment policy and training meet “all reasonable 
steps”, or even that they are positive steps at all. While there is no definitive research 
on how to prevent sexual harassment, it is likely that this is because there is no single 
way to do so, and employers and institutions need to be more active in working out the 
needs of their own workplaces. 
We believe that statutory guidelines should be developed by the AHRC based on its 
lengthy experience of conciliating in sexual harassment matters that are given authority 
by the legislation. These need to be developed in accordance with the best current 
research in the field. The existing guidelines, Effectively preventing and responding to 
sexual harassment: A Code of Practice for Employers (AHRC, 2008) provide useful 
guidance but they need to be updated and strengthened, and they have no legislative 
status requiring compliance with them to be considered in assessing vicarious liability. 
New or revised guidelines could cover issues such as the steps currently outlined in the 
existing Code of Practice to develop policy and procedures for dealing with harassment 
and discrimination. They should also cover the operation of those procedures and 
policies when a complaint of harassment is made so that an employer cannot defend 
against liability for harassment where their investigation and response to the complaint 
has been deficient, even if their policy and procedures met the required standard on 
paper.  																																																								
42 The relevant case law is set out in AHRC, Federal Discrimination Law, 2016, para 4.9.3 
43 See, e.g., Grant E Buckner et al, ‘Managing Workplace Sexual Harassment: The Role of Manager 
Training’ (2014) 26 Employment Responsibility Rights Journal 257; Vicky J Magley et al, ‘Changing 
Sexual Harassment within Organizations via Training Interventions: Suggestions and Empirical Data’ in 
Ronald J Burke (ed), The Fulfilling Workplace: The Organization’s Role in Achieving Individual and 
Organisational Health (Cooper, Taylor & Francis Group, 2013) 225; Justine E Tinkler, Yan E Li and 
Stefanie Mollborn, ‘Can Legal Interventions Change Beliefs? The Effect of Exposure to Sexual 
Harassment Policy on Men’s Gender Beliefs’ (2007) 70(4) Social Psychology Quarterly 480. 
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Recommendation 8 
Statutory evidence-based guidelines should be developed by the AHRC to assist 
employers in taking “all reasonable steps” to prevent sexual harassment. 
Recent thorough empirical research in the US has identified that there, 99.8% of people 
subject to sexual harassment at work never file formal charges with the EEOC or their 
state agency. Where formal charges were filed, the majority of employers reacted 
punitively: 68% of sexual harassment charges include an allegation of employer 
retaliation and 64% of sexual harassment charges are associated with job loss. 44 
Although no similar research has been done in Australia (and may not be able to be 
done because of difficulties in accessing agency files for research), it is likely that high 
levels of punitive responses also occur.45 In order to rely on the defence of having taken 
‘all reasonable steps’ to prevent harassment, an employer should have to demonstrate 
not only having adopted policy and procedures but also implementing them in a way 
that provides an effective response to a complaint in each individual case. If law seeks 
to encourage the use of internal claiming processes in order to resolve harassment cases 
as early as possible, it must ensure that employers have an incentive to ensure effective 
processes that take account of the needs and interests of the parties to the complaint as 
well as the employer’s interests. If there was not an effective process, or if the claimant 
was penalised for making a complaint (whether internal or external), then it should not 
be possible to rely on the reasonable steps defence. In addition, if any victimisation 
occurred as a result of raising a complaint either internally or externally, then the 
victimisation should be able to be dealt with in the same proceedings as the original 
claim, in order to minimise the effort required for enforcement by the claimant. 
Recommendation 9 
The victimisation provision in s 94 should be amended to include protection 
against victimisation for a claimant who raises a claim or makes an inquiry 
about a claim internally in the workplace. 
Where a victimisation claim is brought, it should be processed and heard with 
the primary claim in order to allow the issues to be resolved in one process which 
is more efficient and effective for the enforcement system and the claimant. 
 
																																																								
44 Carly McCann, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, and M. V. Lee Badgett, Employer’s Responses to Sexual 
Harassment, Centre for Employment Equity, University of Massachusetts, Amherst (Dec 2018). 
45 Reported case law certainly illustrates punitive responses in many cases. E.g. Richardson v Oracle 
Corporation Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 82, Choi v Deloitte Touche Tomatsu [2016] NSW CATAD 
304. 
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Scope of the prohibition in relation to customers, clients and third parties 
Although the SDA prohibits sexual harassment in the supply and receipt of goods and 
services and supply of accommodation, this protection is too limited.  It does not 
explicitly require employers to take reasonable steps as far as possible to protect their 
workers from harassment by customers or other third parties. Employers must be held 
responsible for taking steps to protect their employees when dealing with customers or 
clients of the employer, as the employer is the one who determines the workplace 
conditions for their employees and is the only one with power to make changes to better 
protect employees. While such harassment may be covered by provisions against 
harassment in the provision of goods, services and accommodation, those provisions 
do not expressly require employers to take steps to protect their employees. However 
an employer who permits such conduct, could be liable under s 105 of the SDA if this 
section was amended to apply to sexual harassment.  
By way of example, this is the approach adopted in other jurisdictions including 
Canada,46 New Zealand,47 and Ireland.48 In each of these jurisdictions, an employer is 
made liable, albeit in more proscribed circumstances, for harassment by clients, 
customers or other business contacts. 
Recommendation 10 
That a provision, equivalent to s 106, be inserted making employers and 
principals vicariously liable for harassment of their workers by customers and 
clients unless they took all reasonable steps to prevent it. That s 105 be amended 
to apply to sexual harassment. 
e  Areas  
Two State jurisdictions prohibit sexual harassment without restricting protection to 
limited areas of public life, including employment. In Queensland, s 118 of the Anti-
Discrimination Act (1991) and in Tasmania, s 17 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, 
prohibit sexual harassment without any restriction to specified areas.  
The most recent comprehensive discrimination law reform reviews in other 
jurisdictions have recommended similar changes. In 2015, the Law Reform Advisory 
Council in the ACT recommended that the Discrimination Act should be amended to 
prohibit sexual harassment generally, in all areas of life (Recommendation 15.1).   In 
2012, the federal consolidation of anti-discrimination law project made the same 
recommendation.  
																																																								
46 British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v Schrenk 2017 SCC 62 
47 Employment Relations Act 2000 (NZ) s 117.  
48 Employment Equality Act 1998 – 2015 s 23(1).  
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While this Inquiry is focused on workplace sexual harassment, there are still good 
reasons for considering the removal of an ‘areas’ restriction in the SDA:   
• Sexual harassment is socially pervasive and takes place in many areas of life. Unless 
there is a reason to restrict coverage, we consider that beneficial human rights 
legislation should provide as much protection as possible for discriminatory acts. 
Sexual harassment provisions should not be limited by placing unnecessary hurdles 
to bringing complaints. The expanded coverage in other Australian state 
jurisdictions demonstrates that removal of area restrictions is possible and practical.  
• Where areas of sexual harassment are demarcated, the lines of demarcation can 
themselves become an unnecessary source of legal and regulatory attention. So, for 
example, what constitutes “work” changes over time. Removing area restrictions 
provides clarity and prevents resources being wasted on seeking legal 
determinations on the demarcations of areas of activity over time.  
• The removal of areas restrictions in other jurisdictions, along with the equivalent 
recommendations for change in the other most recent law reform inquiries, 
demonstrates that this is the direction that sexual harassment law reform is taking. 
A change to the SDA would be consistent with the overall direction of sexual 
harassment law reform.  
One possible argument against removing the areas restriction is that it may take away 
from a focus on the key areas of public life where sexual harassment is both common 
and possible to regulate. For example, while street harassment is extremely common, it 
is difficult to regulate effectively through a civil action such as sexual harassment.  
On balance, we recommend that the areas restriction be removed. 
Recommendation 11 
That consideration be given to expanding sexual (and sex-based) harassment to 
all areas, without restriction. 
4.2 Enforcer and Remedies 
Sexual harassment laws rely on the individual claimant for enforcement. There is no 
scope for the AHRC or another statutory agency to take action on their behalf or on the 
community’s behalf. Nor can the AHRC assist the individual financially or otherwise 
if they take their claim to court. As we have noted above, the individual complaints 
system is complex and costly, and after four decades, it has not adequately addressed 
sexual harassment in the workplace.  
We recommend that the AHRC be given the power to enforce the SDA by taking claims 
on behalf of individuals and groups. It is not anticipated that the AHRC would fund all 
claims that were pursued to the Federal Courts; it would be expected to take a strategic 
approach to its litigation work and support cases that would clarify and develop the law, 
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address systemic issues, and have an impact on a group of women.  We further 
recommend that the AHRC be given the power to seek the imposition of preventative 
or corrective orders and civil penalties on non-compliant organisations (in addition to 
seeking remedies for the individual/s). The AHRC should be empowered to work with 
respondents to resolve matters using enforceable undertakings 
This model has already been used successfully by the Fair Work Ombudsman to 
address many forms of unlawful conduct in the workplace and could be replicated to 
address sexual harassment in the workplace.  
Finally, we recommend that the AHRC receive additional resources so that it can 
perform this new, important function effectively. 
As discussed below, we also recommend that the FW Act prohibit sexual harassment 
and, consequently, that the Fair Work Ombudsman be given the power to enforce the 
new prohibition.  
Recommendation 12 
That the AHRC be given the power to enforce the SDA by taking claims on behalf 
of individuals and groups.  
That the AHRC be given the power to seek the imposition of civil penalties on non-
compliant organisations (in addition to seeking remedies for the individual/s).  
That the AHRC receive additional resources so that it can perform this new, 
important function effectively. 
4.3 Process  
a Confidentiality of complaints 
As described above, the process of making and resolving a sexual harassment claim is 
confidential which gives the impression that the wrong is a private matter between 
individuals, rather than part of a broader social problem. This is compounded by the 
fact that most claims settle; they are not heard by a court.49 Those that settle include a 
confidentiality clause which can extend as far as preventing the claimant from talking 
about the circumstances of the claim, the parties involved, its resolution and the terms 
of settlement. The use of confidentiality clauses masks the extent to which sexual 
harassment remains a problem in society, its nature and it hides how it is being 
addressing. The AHRC does not publish de-identified data about the terms of 
settlement.  																																																								
49 See further Dominique Allen, ‘Settling Sexual Harassment Complaints – What Benefits does ADR 
Offer?’ (2013) 24 Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 169-177; Dominique Allen, ‘Behind the 




That the AHRC should be given additional resources for collecting and 
disseminating data about the prevalence of sexual harassment and how claims are 
being resolved, and that it should regularly make de-identified settlement data 
available to practitioners, academics and the public (via its website and in its 
annual report). To the extent necessary, the Act should be amended to authorise 
such use of data regardless of the application of confidentiality clauses. 
b Compulsory conciliation 
In order to access the federal court system for a legal determination, complaints must 
first go to the AHRC for conciliation. 
While there are significant benefits to conciliation, it is sometimes inappropriate or 
undesirable for a complainant to go through the conciliation process. For example, 
where sexual harassment is one aspect of a more complex matter that is otherwise being 
litigated, compulsory conciliation creates a separate process for one part of a claim, 
meaning that it may be dropped. Further, where complainant does not want to 
conciliate, they should be able to waive conciliation and receive a termination notice to 
access the court system. This would enable them to avoid the delay that is often 
associated with accessing conciliation. 
Recommendation 14 
That conciliation should no longer be compulsory and complainants should be 
able to lodge their claim in the federal courts if they so desire.  
c Costs  
Among serious barriers to the ability to bring a sexual harassment claim to protect rights 
are the general civil procedure litigation rules that apply to federal civil litigation, which 
interact with the assessment of damages in sexual harassment matters as discussed 
below. These rules apply with particular harshness in sexual harassment claims because 
of the structure in which an individual must bring a claim against their employer or ex- 
employer, which is likely to be an organisations with much larger resources and a less 
personal stake in the matter, and from the low level of damages assessed in most 
reported sexual harassment claims. The best example is Richardson v Oracle,50 in 
which a sexual harassment claimant succeeded in her claim in the Federal Court, but 
was awarded only $18,000 damages, a remarkably low amount given the harm she 
suffered, and the costs and risks involved in litigating her claim.  
Because of the operation of the Federal Court Rules (which are very similar to the costs 
rules in other Australian courts) and because she had refused to settle for an offer of 																																																								
50 Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 82. 
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$55,000 before the hearing occurred, instead of having her costs paid as she had 
succeeded, she was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent from the date of the offer 
on an indemnity basis (ie the full costs incurred).51 This was financially disastrous and 
her legal success became a pyrrhic victory. In effect, a claimant is put in the position of 
having to gamble on weighing the amount of damages a court would award her if she 
succeeded against the risk of paying the other side’s indemnity costs. This cannot be 
regarded as a satisfactory process in proceedings to resolve an individual work dispute 
that concerns protection of a human right: it operates not as a general incentive to 
negotiate a settlement but as an almost insuperable barrier to enforcing the law, given 
the usually low damages awarded in sexual harassment cases. Richardson had little 
alternative but to appeal the decision on damages to the Full Federal Court, which 
upheld her appeal. The Court decided that the category of damages for pain and 
suffering (ie not proved economic loss) for sexual harassment had been evaluated well 
below the level of compensation set in comparable cases, such as common law personal 
injuries claims for psychological injuries resulting from workplace bullying and 
harassment. The Court decided that her damages for pain and suffering should be 
increased to $100,000, and she should be awarded $30,000 for economic loss for a 
period after she left Oracle when her salary in her new job was lower. As a result, she 
was no longer liable to pay the respondent’s costs, and instead they were required to 
pay hers. Because the amount awarded exceeded the amount of a counter offer to settle 
made on her behalf, her costs were to be paid on an indemnity basis by the respondent 
from that date.52 
The impact of these costs rules exacerbates the risks of litigating a sexual harassment 
claim and emphasises the inappropriateness of requiring individuals to bring claims 
against their employers in the civil courts on the same basis as other civil litigation. 
Enforcing a claim under the FW Act does not involve such risks, as costs are not 
generally awarded unless circumstances are exceptional. Australia’s anti-
discrimination laws limit the vindication of human rights claims to the individual 
affected with no assistance from a public agency, and then impose punitive civil 
litigation and costs rules on the litigant. This is not an effective enforcement mechanism 
of the type Australia agreed to provide when it ratified the UN Human Rights and 
Discrimination Conventions. 
The difficulties in this area are further support for the argument, below at XX, that 
employers need to be incentivised to act on prevention, as individual resolution of 
disputes is not an adequate process, and that sexual harassment should be prohibited in 
the FW Act (see below), so that process is open for use.  
																																																								
51 Ibid at [234] – [237]. 
52 Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 139. 
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5 DEVELOPING AND UTILISING PREVENTION SYTEMS 
5.1 To effect change, we need to require and enable change 
To complement the claims system outlined above, we need to include in the regulatory 
mix laws that prompt proactive, preventative action.  This means ensuring that there is 
a positive duty on organisational leaders to take steps to prevent sexual harassment.  
But a duty alone is not sufficient to effect change.  There are other regulatory elements 
required to ensure that such a duty is effective.  In this section we set out briefly what 
elements are required for a positive duty to effect change, how anti-discrimination laws 
could be amended to include such an approach, and our argument that work health and 
safety laws already reflect this approach but need to be enlivened to address sexual 
harassment.   
5.2 Modern regulatory theories 
When examined in light of modern regulatory theories, it is not surprising that anti-
discrimination laws have not transformed norms and cultures sufficiently to address 
sexual harassment.  These laws are focused on allowing individuals to claim redress 
after the fact, with little power to challenge and transform the cultures that allow such 
behaviour.  Additional and complementary regulatory mechanisms are needed to 
challenge the underlying phenomenon to prevent harassment.  One key part of a more 
effective regulatory mix would be reflexive regulation, which is designed to effect 
cultural change within institutions, such as workplaces.  
The theory of reflexive regulation focuses on ways to prompt institutions to review and 
revise their own internal practices, to meet public policy goals.53  The aim of this 
regulation is to alter the behaviour of the regulated actors (e.g. those within workplaces) 
prospectively, rather than merely enforce rules following their breach. This ‘second 
generation regulation’ seeks to promote ‘a culture of compliance’.54  To drive change, 
it relies less on litigation of individual cases of breaches, and ‘more on responsive 
proceduralized self-regulation, in which compliance is based on developing the 
capacity of institutions to address inequality’ 55  and skilfully wielding enforcement 
powers to ensure this happens. 
A leading UK equality scholar, Bob Hepple, applied this theory of reflexive regulation 
to equality and identified three necessary criteria in the design of effective laws:56 
																																																								
53 Manfredi et al, ‘The Public Sector Equality duty:  enforcing equality rights through second generation 
regulation’ (2018) 47(3) Industrial Law Journal 365, 372. This theory of reflexive regulation, based on 
autopoesis or systems theory, posits that law cannot directly change norms within organisations, but has 
potential to indirectly change them by prompting internal reflection and action. 
54 Manfredi et al, above n 53, 370. 
55 Manfredi et al, above n 53, 371. 
56 Manfredi et al, above n 53, 372, citing to B. Hepple ‘Enforcing Equality Law: Two Steps Forward and 
Two Steps Backwards of Reflexive Regulation’ (2011) 40 Industrial Law Journal 321 
 33 
• Positive duty:  A legal duty that requires the organisation to scrutinise its own 
practices, to prompt ‘self-regulation’; 
• Stakeholder involvement:  ‘involvement of “interest groups (such as managers, 
employees and service users) who must be informed, consulted and engaged in the 
process of change”’; and 
• Enabling and Enforcing:  ‘an enforcement agency … which should provide the 
back-up role of assistance, building capabilities and ultimately sanction where 
voluntary methods fail’. 
These three ‘interlocking mechanisms’ are not effective in isolation.  They operate 
together to create a: 
triangular relationship among those regulated … others whose interests are affected … 
and the enforcement agency as the guardian of the public interest.57 
The duty:  The duty is a positive one, imposed on those who have some capacity to 
change the culture and prevent the offending behaviour. It requires the organisational 
leaders to audit the organisation to identify how the particular problem manifests – what 
are the risks and problems – in that particular context, and develop a response that is 
tailored to that particular context.   
Stakeholder involvement:  A critical and often overlooked part of this system of 
regulation is the active and informed engagement of stakeholders in these processes of 
identifying the problem and designing responses.  In the case of sexual harassment, 
stakeholders include all workplace participants; not just management and officers, but 
those who are at risk of experiencing harassment and even potential perpetrators.  ‘Such 
second-generation regulatory mechanisms aim to be participative and deliberative, 
thereby ensuring their effectiveness as they can draw on the experience of those with 
the best practical knowledge and experience of any obstacles to implementation.’58 
Agency role:  To ensure that the positive duty and consultation are not merely checkbox 
or bureaucratic exercises, there must be some agency input and oversight.  The agency 
role is two-fold – enabling compliance and enforcing it.  Many organisations upon 
whom the positive duty falls will lack the will, insight or resources to be able to comply.  
Consultation with stakeholders could provide insight, but even this could be 
perfunctory and thus not challenge or change behaviours or norms.  Agencies, with 
sufficient resources and expertise, need to be empowered to build the capacity of duty-
bearers to respond effectively.  This might mean providing training or guidance 
materials, or enabling stakeholders to participate more fully and forcefully in 
consultations and deliberations about organisational responses.  Such enabling powers, 
however, must be paired with enforcement powers.  By providing an enforcement 																																																								
57 Hepple, (n56). 
58 Manfredi et al, above n 53, 371 
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agency with a range or pyramid of enforcement tools, the agency has capacity to 
regulate responsively.59  With a range of ‘soft’ tools of persuasion and education, 
combined with access to harder tools of punitive sanctions, the agency can more 
effectively encourage and ensure compliance.  In this system, the agency must have 
power to identify risks and wrong-doing, enable compliance (through guidance, 
capacity building etc.) and, ultimately enforce the rules.   
To address sexual harassment in work we need a positive duty on those within 
workplaces to take active steps to prevent harassment. But this duty cannot merely be 
an unenforceable suggestion.  It needs to be within a regulatory framework that compels 
engagement with stakeholders, and empowers and resources an agency to enable and 
enforce compliance.   
5.3 Positive duties in anti-discrimination laws?   
As noted above, currently our anti-discrimination laws prohibit harassment, but do not 
require or effectively enable organisations to change.  They do not impose a positive 
duty on organisations to audit or self-regulate.  They impose no obligations to inform, 
consult or engage stakeholders in identifying risks of harassment or designing 
solutions.  And, while the AHRC has some important powers of providing education 
and guidance, these can only be offered, not wielded in any strategic pyramid of 
enforcement.60  
Many have suggested that our anti-discrimination laws should be amended to include 
an enforceable positive duty to prevent discrimination and harassment. The purpose of 
positive duties is to place obligations onto duty-holders to prevent, rather than merely 
respond to discrimination and sexual harassment.61  Such a duty requires duty-bearers 
to acknowledge and dismantle systemic workplace practices which allow for sexual 
harassment to occur.  
In many jurisdictions there has been the growing utilisation of responsive and reflexive 
regulation theory.  Comparable jurisdictions have introduced elements of a proactive 
model aimed at institutional change.62   As Fredman has articulated, this approach 
moves away from the fault-based model of traditional anti-discrimination measures and 
instead focuses on the capacity of institutions to address issues of systemic inequality.63  
The UK, among other jurisdictions, has taken this step.  The UK’s public sector equality 
duty is an example of this kind of second generation reflexive law, designed to 																																																								
59  Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford Socio-Legal Studies.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 205; John Braithwaite, 'The 
Essence of Responsive Regulation', (2011) 44 University of British Columbia Law Review 475-520. 
60 Belinda Smith, ‘A regulatory analysis’, above n 12, 105, 109, 111-112.  Cf Fair Work Ombudsman.   
61 Belinda Smith, ‘Not the Baby and the Bathwater’, above n 1, 713.  
62 Belinda Smith, ‘It’s About Time’, above n 1, 137.  
63 Sandra Fredman, ‘Changing the Norm: Positive Duties in Equal Treatment Legislation’ (2005) 12 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 369, 373 and Belinda Smith and Dominique 
Allen, ‘Whose Fault Is It?’, above n 12. 
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complement and enhance the individual claims-based system of anti-discrimination 
laws to achieve greater cultural change.64  Though the duty appears to be very modest, 
research shows it has already had some effect in changing practices and norms as this 
theory predicts.65   
It is important when designing a positive equality duty that it does not become an 
‘exercise in procedure and paperwork’ but rather does create institutional change.66  To 
do this, each part of Hepple’s interlocking regulatory mechanism needs to be engaged.  
A positive duty should be action-based and goal-orientated.67  Such a duty should 
require duty-bearers to scrutinize organizational practices and institutional patterns 
which allow harassment to occur rather than only focus on individual complainants and 
the individuals responsible for the harassment.  
The duty should require the consultation and involvement of all workplace participants 
in identifying and addressing the institutional patterns and structures which perpetuate 
harassment in the workplace. 68   This engages the stakeholder arm of Hepple’s 
interlocking regulatory mechanism and allows for the approach of the duty-bearer to 
engage with and better understand how sexual harassment manifests in that workplace 
and the best way to tackle it.69  It focuses on the need for training for members of the 
organisation and the continued monitoring of the effectiveness of the policies and 
practices of the organisation.70  
Finally, for any positive duty to have the desired outcome, the regulator (such as 
AHRC) must have a range of powers available to them to support such a duty.71  This 
can involve supporting self-regulation through persuasion, advice, the provision of 
guidance on best practice and evidence of the practices of comparable organisations.72  
However, to be effective, there needs to be sufficient sanctions in case of non-
compliance through powers of enforcement involving a range of systemic corrective 
																																																								
64 Sandra Fredman and Sarah Spencer, 'Beyond Discrimination: It's Time for Enforceable Duties on 
Public Bodies to Promote Equality Outcomes', European Human Rights Law Review, 6 (2006), 598-606; 
Sandra Fredman, 'Changing the Norm’ (n63), Sandra Fredman, 'Equality as Proactive Duty' (2012) 60 
American Journal of Comparative Law 265; Christopher Mccrudden, 'Equality Legislation and Reflexive 
Regulation: A Response to the Discrimination Law Review's Consultative Paper', Industrial Law 
Journal, 36/3 (2007), 255-66. 
65 Manfredi et al, above n 53; S Arthur, M Mitchell, J Graham & K Beninger (NatCen), Views and 
Experiences of the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) Qualitative research to inform the review 
(Government Equalities Office, Sept 2013). 
66 Sandra Fredman and Sarah Spencer, ‘Delivering Equality: Towards an Outcome-Focused Positive 
Duty’ (Submission to the Cabinet Office Equality Review to the Discrimination Law Review, June 
2006), 1.  
67 Ibid, 10. 
68 Ibid, 12.  
69 Belinda Smith, ‘How might information bolster anti-discrimination laws’ (n15).  
70 Smith, ‘It’s About Time – For a New Regulatory Approach to Equality’ (n1) 
71 Smith, ‘Not the Baby and the Bathwater’, above n 1, 723. 
72 Smith, ‘Not the Baby and the Bathwater’, above 1, 727; Smith, ‘It’s About Time – For a New 
Regulatory Approach to Equality’, above n 1, 142 and 143.    
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orders and even penalties.73  A positive duty needs to be supported through a range of 
compliance measures and sanctions consistent with Braithwaite’s regulatory pyramid.  
Recommendation 15: 
A positive duty to prevent, rather than merely respond to discrimination and 
sexual harassment.  
A positive equality duty be developed carefully with close stakeholder engagement 
and reflection, is directed at real institutional change, and include: 
• a requirement on duty-bearers to scrutinize organizational practices and 
institutional patterns which allow harassment to occur; 
• consultation and involvement of all workplace participants; 
• training for members of the organisations involved;  
• continued monitoring of the effectiveness of the policies and practices of the 
organisation; and 
• a range of powers for the regulator (such as the AHRC) including compliance 
measures and sanctions to support such a duty. 
5.4 Existing laws – work health and safety 
In any event, it is time to recognize that a positive duty already applies to organisational 
leaders to prevent sexual harassment in workplaces (and beyond).  Our Work Health 
and Safety (WHS) laws impose such a duty to proactively identify and address risks of 
harm in the workplace, and these include obligations to consult stakeholders.  These 
laws also empower government agencies to enable and enforce compliance.  In contrast 
to anti-discrimination laws, WHS laws more closely reflect the theory of reflexive 
regulation and allow for responsive regulation.   
Recalling Hepple’s three requirements for reflexive regulation, it is clear that WHS 
laws reflect this framework: 
 Reflexive Regulation theory WHS laws provide 
1. a positive duty to scrutinize 
organizational practices 
a positive duty on employers to ensure, so 
far as is reasonably practicable, the health 
and safety of workers and other workplace 
participants, and this includes psychological 
health 
2. a consultation requirement with a raft of associated duties (eg 
consultation, cooperation, training and 
																																																								
73 Smith, ‘Not the Baby and the Bathwater’, above n 1, 705 – 706.  
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monitoring) to give effect to the primary 
duty 
3 an agency that can: 
• Enable:  build capacity 
• Enforce: ultimately 
sanction 
WHS agencies that: 
• provide assistance (codes of practice, 
guidance materials, etc); and 
• enforcement (with access to a range of 
possible sanctions for non-compliance). 
There can be no doubt that WHS statutes are intended to address the types of 
psychological and physical harms that often result from harassment (and 
discrimination).  The object of the Model WHS Act74 is ‘to secure the health and safety 
of workers and workplaces’,75 including by eliminating or minimising risks arising 
from work to protect ‘workers and other persons against harm to their health, safety 
and welfare’.76  ‘Health’ is defined to include ‘psychological health.’77  
The primary duty of care imposed by the Model WHS Act is on a person conducting a 
business or undertaking (PCBU) to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the 
health and safety of workers and other workplace participants (e.g. volunteers, 
contractors, suppliers) under their effective control.78  PCBUs must also ensure that a 
workplace that they manage or control, or anything arising from that workplace, does 
not put at risk the health and safety of any person.79  
The focus is not on individuals and isolated incidents of misbehaviour; the focus is on 
systems and cultures.  The obligation requires the PCBU to provide and maintain safe 
‘systems of work’80 and a ‘work environment’ that is safe and without risk to health.81 
In addition, PCBUs must so far as is reasonably practicable, consult with workers and 
any health and safety representatives about work health and safety matters that directly 
affect them;82 and provide ‘any information, training, instruction or supervision that is 
necessary to protect all persons from risks to their health and safety arising from work 
carried out as part of the conduct of the business or undertaking.’83  
However, there is a fundamental problem:  despite the growing evidence of the 
seriousness and pervasiveness of sexual harassment and the harm that it causes, 
Australian WHS agencies have shown remarkable blindness or reluctance to 																																																								
74 There are nine sets of WHS statutes across Australia, but seven of the these reflect the Model Act 
developed through a national harmonization process (2008-2011), with Victoria and Western Australia 
legislating independently. 
75 Work, Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) s 3(1).  
76 Work, Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) s 3(1)(a). 
77 Work, Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) (s 4 and Schedule 5). 
78 Work, Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) s 19(1).  
79 Work, Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth), s 20.   
80 Work, Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) s 19(3)(c). 
81 Work, Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) s 19(3)(a). 
82 Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) s47(1). 
83 Work, Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) s 19(3)(f). 
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acknowledge harassment as a workplace hazard that warrants their attention.  Unless 
and until WHS agencies acknowledge and address this gap, this whole system that is 
explicitly designed to protect workers from harm will continue to fail to protect workers 
from sexual harassment. 
There is growing recognition across Australia84 that sexual harassment is part of a wider 
problem of gender inequality and gender violence, and that a focus on gender, and that 
health and safety laws should be enlivened as part of the regulatory response.  Other 
submissions to this inquiry have similarly recognized the absence or underperformance 
of WHS agencies85 in protecting women from this workplace hazard.   
There is also growing international support for characterizing sexual harassment as a 
gendered harm and one that warrants a proactive response that includes attention to 
health and safety.  
In August 2018, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), released a draft 
Convention (with associated Recommendation) on Ending Violence and Harassment 
in the World of Work. 86   This was developed after years of consideration and 
consultation with governments and representative organisations of employers and 
workers, including those from Australia.87  The draft Convention defines ‘violence and 
harassment’ as ‘a range of unacceptable behaviours and practices, or threats thereof, 
whether a single occurrence or repeated, having the aim or effect of causing physical, 
psychological, sexual or economic harm, and includes gender-based violence and 
harassment’.88  ‘Gender-based violence and harassment’ are in turn defined to mean 
‘violence and harassment directed at persons because of their sex or gender, or affecting 
persons of a particular sex or gender disproportionately, and includes sexual 
harassment.’89  
The preamble to the draft Convention recognises ‘an inclusive, integrated and gender-
responsive approach, which tackles underlying causes and risk factors, including 
gender stereotypes, multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination, and unequal 
																																																								
84  See, e.g.,  Victorian Trades Hall Council, Stop Gendered Violence at Work (Report, 2017) 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/victorianunions/pages/4164/attachments/original/1511416569/
Stop_GV_At_Work_Report_2017.pdf?1511416569; Unions NSW, Reforms to Sexual Harassment Laws 
(Discussion Paper, 2018), 
http://www.asmofnsw.org.au/DISCUSSION_PAPER_Reforms_to_sexual_harassment_laws_Final_13
_August_2018.pdf ; Northern Territory Working Women’s Centre, Submission to NT Workplace Health 
and Safety Review (2018). 
85 See e.g. Submission 170:  Professors McDonald and Charlesworth; Victorian Legal Aid submission; 
Unions NSW submission.   
86 International Labour Office, Ending Violence and Harassment in the World of Work (Report V(1), 
108th Session, 2019), <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_637108.pdf> 97.   
87 For Australia, this included the federal government, the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
88 ILO (n86) Art 1 (a) 
89 ILO (n86) Art 1(b). 
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gender-based power relations, is essential to ending violence and harassment in the 
world of work’.90  
The draft Convention sets out the prevention measures that Member states must take, 
including national laws and regulations that require employers to take steps to prevent 
workplace harassment and violence, and which:91  
(a)  adopt and implement, in consultation with workers and their representatives, a 
workplace policy on violence and harassment;  
(b) take into account violence and harassment and associated psychosocial risks in the 
management of occupational safety and health;  
(c) identify hazards and assess the risks of violence and harassment, with the 
participation of workers and their representatives, and take measures to prevent and 
control them; and  
(d) provide to workers concerned information and training on the identified hazards and 
risks of violence and harassment and the associated prevention and protection 
measures.  
Member states are required to ensure that ‘guidance, resources, training or other tools 
are provided to employers, workers and their organizations’,92 and that the duties on 
employers are monitored and enforced, with appropriate sanctions.93     
Governments in other countries have already adopted laws that reflect this approach. 
Two examples from Canada are provided.  In Canada, the need for an employer to take 
steps to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace in the workplace is embedded in 
the national workplace health and safety regulation. The Canadian Labour Code 
requires every employer to produce a policy statement (after consultation with their 
employees) which includes the following:94 
• A definition of sexual harassment (based on the one provided in the Code) 
• A statement that everyone is entitled to be free from sexual harassment 
• A statement that the employer will make every reasonable effort to ensure that 
no employee is subject to sexual harassment 
• A statement that the employer will take such disciplinary measures as the 
employer deems appropriate; 
• A statement outlining the complaints procedure 
• A statement confirming non-disclosure or complaints unless required by law.  
																																																								
90 ILO (n86) 16. 
91 ILO (n86) Art 9. 
92 ILO (n86) Art 11. 
93 ILO (n86) Art 10. 
94 Labour Code s 247.4(1) and (2) 
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Additionally, all persons under the direction of the employer must be made aware of 
this policy.95 
Further, the Act to amend the Canada Labour Code (harassment and violence), the 
Parliamentary Employment and Staff Relations Act and the Budget Implementation 
Act, 2017 was passed in October 2018, and create the following obligations for 
employers:96 
• Take prescribed measures to prevent and protect against harassment and 
violence in the workplace and offer support to employees affected by 
harassment and violence in the workplace 
• Ensure that all employees, including those who have supervisory or managerial 
responsibilities receive training in the prevention of harassment and violence in 
the workplace 
• Ensure that the complaints person is trained or has knowledge or experience to 
deal with issues relating to harassment.  
At a provincial level in Canada, there are also obligations contained in the Occupational 
Work and Safety Acts. For example. The Ontario Act requires employers to have a 
policy with respect to workplace harassment which is reviewed annually (at a 
minimum), be and posted in a conspicuous location in the workplace (unless there are 
under 5 employees).97 
 The program must include the following:98 
• Measures and procedures for workers to report incidents of workplace 
harassment to the employer 
• Measures and procedures for workers to report incidents of workplace 
harassment to a person other than the employer in cases where the employer is 
the harasser.  
• Set out how incidents and complaints will be dealt with 
• Set out the non-disclosure regime associated with the complaint 
• Set out how the worker(s) will be informed of the outcome of any investigation 
and of how corrective action can be taken as a result of the investigation.  
 The employer’s duties with respect to harassment in the workplace include:99 
• A duty to conduct an appropriate investigation 
																																																								
95 Labour Code s 247.4(4).  
96 Act to amend the Canada Labour Code (harassment and violence), the Parliamentary Employment and 
Staff Relations Act and the Budget Implementation Act, 2017, s 3(3).  
97  Occupational Work and Safety Act s 32.0.1(1)(b) (Ontario) 
98 Occupational Work and Safety Act s 32.0.1(2) and (3) (Ontario) 
99 Occupational Work and Safety Act s 32.0.6 
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• A duty to inform complainants and alleged harassers (if a worker) of the 
outcome and actions that will be taken 
The approach adopted in Canada recognises sexual harassment as a workplace hazard. 
It does not focus on an individual complaint, but instead focuses on the systems and 
procedures that need to be in place to combat sexual harassment in the workplace.  
Recommendation 16 
The AHRC should do what it can to ensure: 
WHS agencies and employers understand that sexual harassment is a workplace 
hazard that poses a serious risk to the health and safety of Australian workers; 
and 
WHS agencies acknowledge this and act upon it to: 
• educate employers (and other ‘persons conducting a business or undertaking’, 
their ‘officers’ and workers) about this workplace hazard; 
• develop guidance materials (including a Code of Practice) to enable 
prevention; and 
• enforce the WHS duties in respect of sexual harassment. 
Recommendation 17  
The WHS agencies should be compelled to: 
• engage with the AHRC in developing expertise in identifying sexual 
harassment and sexual harassment risks in work;  
• nominate specific personnel within the inspectorates to develop such expertise 
in identifying sexual harassment and sexual harassment risks in work;  
• engage with the AHRC to develop guidance materials and, ultimately a code 
of practice, specifically in respect of sexual harassment: 
- to help workplace participants prevent sexual harassment; and 
- to enable WHS agencies to hold workplace participants to account in 
prevention steps; 
• report on these steps. 		
6 SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE FAIR WORK ACT 
As a significant proportion of all sexual harassment occurs at work, it is essential that 
there is a specific prohibition of sexual harassment in the national workplace relations 
 42 
laws and that there are viable options for preventing and remedying sexual harassment 
under such laws.  It is also important from a deterrence point of view that the national 
workplace relations regulator, the Fair Work Ombudsman, have a role in prosecuting 
such conduct.    
At present, there are no specific provisions in the FW Act directly prohibiting sexual 
harassment or providing a direct means for pursuing a remedy for workplace sexual 
harassment.  Instead, a person who experiences sexual harassment at work has to rely 
on other provisions in the FW Act that do not explicitly refer to sexual harassment, but 
may in some circumstances be found to cover such conduct (discussed below). 
This is unsatisfactory as it does not name the conduct as unacceptable workplace 
behaviour.  Nor does it provide a clear avenue for redress that is readily apparent to 
those who are subject to such conduct/behaviour.  These indirect means of redress are 
very unlikely to be pursued in the absence of legal advice or representation.    
Currently, the primary means for pursuing a claim for sexual harassment under the FW 
Act are the general protections and the bullying provisions of the Act.  Each of these 
has limitations in terms of their effectiveness in preventing and remedying sexual 
harassment at work.   
The general protections provisions in the FW Act prohibit adverse action in 
employment with respect to a range of attributes covered by anti-discrimination laws, 
including sex.  As sexual harassment has been found to constitute sex discrimination, 
it could be a form of adverse action based on sex.  However, the applicant would need 
to prove that the treatment was because of the attribute.  This necessitates a comparative 
approach that relies on less favourable treatment based on an attribute; for example the 
sexualised way that women were treated would not have occurred to men.  This does 
not fit well with the way in which sexual harassment arising in many workplaces, where 
there is an unacceptable sexualisation of the workplace and its culture more broadly, 
which does not hinge on a specific gender differential.  Very few claims have proceeded 
in this manner.  The Fair Work Commission’s General Protections Benchbook 100 
refers to only one case example, where the Court held that, apart from her own 
hypotheses and beliefs, the applicant had not provided any evidence of actions or 
behaviours which were as a result of her sex. 101   It when on to state that to succeed the 
applicant would have to show that the respondent ‘would have acted in a different 
manner if the applicant was not a woman.’102   
Another type of general protections action that could arise is where a person who is 
subject to sexual harassment exercises a workplace right to enquiry or make a complaint 																																																								
100 Fair Work Commission, Benchbook General Protections 
 (https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/documents/benchbookresources/generalprotections/general-
protections-benchbook.pdf). 
101 Evangeline v Department of Human Services [2013] FCCA 807. 
102 Ibid, [10].  
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about harassing conduct or behaviour, and as a consequence is treated adversely in the 
workplace.  This again is an indirect way of dealing the problem and it does not address 
the unacceptable nature of the conduct itself, but instead targets the treatment received 
by a person when seeking some form of assistance or redress.  
Part 6-4B of the FW Act provides an avenue for workers who are bullied at work to 
apply to the Fair Work Commission for an order to stop the bullying they are currently 
experiencing.  It is a regime that does not afford any compensation for what a person 
has experienced, as it is designed primarily to bring unacceptable workplace conduct 
to an end.  No remedy is available to a person who has left the workplace due to such 
treatment. The Commission is given wide powers to make preventative orders  
 The Act defines bullying as repeatedly behaving unreasonably towards a worker where 
that behaviour creates a risk to health and safety. Sexual harassment claims could 
satisfy these three criteria.  The case law arising from applications made under these 
provisions tends to use the terms ‘harassment’ in a generic way as a potential subset of 
bullying, without linking it to any specific type of harassment.  For example, in Amie 
Mac v Bank of Queensland Limited and Others103 the Fair Work Commission indicated 
that some of the features which might be expected to be found in a course of repeated 
unreasonable behaviour constituting bullying at work were: ... ‘intimidation, coercion, 
threats, humiliation, shouting, sarcasm, victimisation, terrorising, singling-out, 
malicious pranks, physical abuse, verbal abuse, emotional abuse, belittling, bad faith, 
harassment, conspiracy to harm, ganging-up, isolation, freezing-out, ostracism, 
innuendo, rumour-mongering, disrespect, mobbing, mocking, victim-blaming and 
discrimination.’ 
While much of the material surrounding the topic of bullying refers to bullying in 
unison with harassment, this scope is not apparent from a reading of the provisions 
themselves.  The Fair Work Ombudsman’s explanation of the anti-bullying laws, while 
referring to harassment generally makes no specific mention of sexual harassment or 
guidance that harassment could be dealt with in this way.104  In contrast the Fact Sheets 
on workplace bullying made available by the Australian Human Rights Commission 
specifically refers to sexual harassment in outlining what bullying at the workplace 
looks like.105  
																																																								
103 [2015] FWC 774 (Hatcher VP, 13 F ebruary 2015) [99]. 
104See  https://www.fairwork.gov.au/employee-entitlements/bullying-and-harassment 
105 https://www.humanrights.gov.au/workplace-bullying-violence-harassment-and-bullying-fact-sheet .   
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Recommendation 18 
Amend the FW Act to: 
• explicitly protect workers from sexual harassment.  This could be prohibited 
as a form of adverse action itself, without the need to identify it as a form of 
discrimination or as coming within the exercise of a workplace right; 
• make clear that sexual harassment comes within the scope of the bullying 
provisions. 
 
 
